Document Type
Article
Recommended Citation
Neely, Erica. “Machines and the Moral Community,” Philosophy and Technology 27(1), 97-111. doi: 10.1007/s13347-013-0114-y (2013).
Abstract
A key distinction in ethics is between members and nonmembers of the moral community. Over time, our notion of this community has expanded as we have moved from a rationality criterion to a sentience criterion for membership. I argue that a sentience criterion is insufficient to accommodate all members of the moral community; the true underlying criterion can be understood in terms of whether a being has interests. This may be extended to conscious, self-aware machines, as well as to any autonomous intelligent machines. Such machines exhibit an ability to formulate desires for the course of their own existence; this gives them basic moral standing. While not all machines display autonomy, those which do must be treated as moral patients; to ignore their claims to moral recognition is to repeat past errors. I thus urge moral generosity with respect to the ethical claims of intelligent machines.
Publication Date
6-2013
DOI
10.1007/s13347-013-0114-y
Notes
This article is a pre-print. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13347-013-0114-y.